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Introduction
In 2016, Amnesty International published a report that documented the systematic
hanging of inmates at Syria’s Saydnaya prison. On the first page, in bold, the report reads,
“Saydnaya is the end of life- the end of humanity.”1 The report details the beatings, rape, and
death of over 17,000 inmates since the onset of the Arab Spring in 2011.2 Initially, it appears that
the horrors of the Assad regime are nothing new, just a continuing legacy of leaders in Syria
using state-sponsored torture to maintain their despotic reign. 3 Bashar al-Assad’s father, Hafez
al-Assad, was famous for his imprisonment of thousands of political opponents. One of his
prisons, Tadmur, was considered “a punitive institution in the form of a concentration camp- a
live demonstration of intimidation, terror, torture and killing.”4
Despite the history of torture under the Assad regime, the recent violations do come as a
surprise, because unlike under Hafez al-Assad, in 2011, the people of Syria finally said enough
to this violence. As the Arab Spring swept through the region, thousands of protestors took to the
streets asking for Assad to step down and end his tyranny. Amnesty International, Syrian NGOs,
the United States, and even defectors from inside the government all stood up to Assad.
However, in 2018, the Syrian Observatory for Human Rights reported that approximately
104,000 individuals and counting had still been tortured to death in Syrian prisons since 2011.5

1

Amnesty International, Human Slaughterhouse: Mass Hangings and Extermination at Saydnaya Prison, Syria
(London: Amnesty International, 2017),
https://www.amnesty.org/download/Documents/MDE2454152017ENGLISH.PDF, 5.
2
Ibid.
3
It should be noted that this paper will be focusing on torture that can be defined as “an act committed by a person
acting under the color of law specifically intended to inflict severe physical or mental pain or suffering (other than
pain or suffering incidental to lawful sanctions) upon another person within his custody or physical control.” (Office
of Legal Counsel, "Definition of Torture Under 18 U.S.C. §§ 2340–2340A," The United States Department of
Justice, 2004, https://www.justice.gov/file/18791/download.)
4
Amnesty International, SYRIA: Torture, despair and dehumanization in Tadmur Military Prison (London:
Amnesty International, 2001), https://www.amnesty.org/download/Documents/132000/mde240142001en.pdf, 10.
5
Syrian Observatory for Human Rights, “Syria: 560,000 killed in seven yrs of war, SOHR,” Syrian Observatory for
Human Rights, December 12, 2018, website available in bibliography.
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Why did these actors fail to stop Bashar al-Assad from practicing state-sponsored torture? Why
could he openly commit crimes against humanity during the Arab Spring and the following civil
war?
At first these answers seem impossible to find, but, in reality, similar to how there is a
long history of torture in Syria, there is also a long history of Bashar al-Assad evading
condemnation and punishment for the use of violence against his own citizens. The Arab Spring
was not the first time that the Syrian people attempted to confront Bashar al-Assad about the
state’s repression.6 In 2000, a group of Syrian intellectuals, in a movement referred to as the
Damascus Spring, mobilized and demanded major reforms of the Syrian government. While the
movement was physically much smaller than the Arab Spring, and the activists did not go as far
as demanding regime change, they did pressure Assad to respect human rights. Nevertheless, this
campaign also failed to change the practice of state-sponsored torture in Syria. Therefore, the
previous questions should read: Why has Bashar al-Assad never been stopped from using statesponsored torture? Why has he been able to openly commit crimes against humanity for two
decades?
In order to answer these questions, the following chapter will review the literature on
human rights movements and contentious politics. This information will be used to create a
model that explains what is required for a human rights movement to be successful during a
period of contention. The model will be applied to Syria through a comparison of the human
rights campaigns during the Damascus Spring and the Arab Spring. It will show that Bashar alAssad has been able to practice state-sponsored torture because of the interference of Syria’s

6

For the purposes of this paper the Syrian state or the Assad regime refers to the Assad family, senior aides, the
Baath Party, and the army and internal security apparatus. Parliament and the rest of the government are controlled
by the regime. (Federal Research Division, “Country Profile: Syria,” Library of Congress, April 2005,
https://www.loc.gov/rr/frd/cs/profiles/Syria-new.pdf).
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allies. Opposition groups have implemented a variety of strategies to pressure the Assad regime,
but all of these tactics have ultimately failed because Syria’s geopolitical importance ensures that
its foreign allies will protect the state at all costs.

3

Chapter 1: Modeling Human Rights Campaigns in Periods of Contentious Politics
Theoretical Background
The study of human rights is still a relatively new field of political science. Much of what
is understood about the methods of achieving compliance with these social norms was
discovered in the latter half of the twentieth century when human rights advocacy networks
started to appear in the 1970s.7 In 1999, Thomas Risse, Stephen Ropp and Kathryn Sikkink
introduced a new theory on human rights referred to as the “spiral model” in The Power of
Human Rights: International Norms and Domestic Changes. This theory claims that for a human
rights campaign to be successful, there needs to be a combination of pressure from above, or
outside of the state, and pressure from below, or domestic movements. The actors that
traditionally apply pressure from above include international NGOs, international governing
bodies, and other foreign countries. The actors that traditionally apply pressure from below
include domestic NGOs, local governing bodies, and protestors. According to the “spiral model,”
these two sources of pressure must work together in order to force a state to commit and then
comply with human rights norms.
The Five Phases
Risse, Ropp, and Sikkink identify five phases through which a state passes as it shifts
from commitment to compliance. These phases represent different levels of mobilization by
various actors and different levels of reform enacted by the state. The figure on the following
page diagrams the five phases of the “spiral model.” The initial phase is that of repression, in
which governments are able to freely violate human rights. Domestic and international actors are

7

Margaret E. Keck and Kathryn Sikkink, Activists Beyond Borders: Advocacy Networks in International Politics
(Ithaca: Cornell University, 1998), 84-85.
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unable to mobilize because of a limitation on their freedom to assemble and their access to
information about the country.8 Regardless of the intensity of the repression enforced by the
state, there is often a major violation such as a massacre that catches the attention of the
international community.9

Figure 1: The “Spiral Model”

Source: The Power of Human Rights: International Norms and Domestic Changes10

8

Thomas Risse and Kathryn Sikkink, "The socialization of international human rights norms into domestic
practices: introduction," in The Power of Human Rights: International Norms and Domestic Change, edited by
Thomas Risse, Stephen Ropp and Kathryn Sikkink (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1999), 22.
9
Ibid.
10
Ibid, 20.
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The state dismisses its involvement in this event as part of the second phase, denial. Yet,
the abuse still motivates other nations to apply intense pressure from outside the country via
“information politics.”11 Eventually the state should become so vulnerable that it will be forced
to make reforms because its foreign allies begin to waiver in their support. These reforms begin
what is known as the phase of tactical concessions, which is when the state makes a limited
effort to appease the opposition by passing unsubstantial human rights legislation. Often states
will allow for limited investigations, or create benign working groups that focus on human rights.
These concessions are considered “low cost,”12 but they facilitate the mobilization of domestic
movements.
Through the combined efforts of domestic and international actors, these concessions
expand until human rights initiatives are granted prescriptive status, which is the fourth phase of
the model. According to Risse and Ropp, prescriptive status includes, “ratifying relevant
international treaties and their optional protocols, changing relevant domestic laws, setting up
domestic human rights institutions, and regularly referring to human rights norms in the state
administrative and bureaucratic discourse.”13 It is important to note that some of these reforms
may also occur during the tactical concessions phase, but what distinguishes these two phases is
the internal dialogue on human rights that the state initiates during the prescriptive status phase.
In this fourth phase, the state should be able to monitor itself to some degree, and not always rely
on the condemnation of outsiders to motivate it to act. In the environment of sustained pressure

11

Information politics is “the ability to quickly and credibly generate politically useable information and move it to
where it will have the most impact.” The information is used to target a state, organization, or individual by
damaging their reputation through the public’s awareness of their crimes or violations of social norms (Thomas
Risse and Kathryn Sikkink, "The socialization of international human rights norms into domestic practices,16).
12
Thomas Risse and Stephan Ropp,"Introduction and Overview," in The Perisistent Power of Human Rights: From
Commitment to Compliance, edited by Thomas Risse, Stephen Ropp and Kathryn Sikkink (Cambridge: Cambridge
University Press, 2013), 6.
13
Ibid, 7.
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from above and below, this prescriptive status phase will evolve into the state adhering to ruleconsistent behavior. This is the last phase of the spiral model, when there are little to no
violations of human rights because the state is willing and adequately able to monitor itself.14
In order to better understand the “spiral model,” it can be helpful to offer an example of a
country, like Morocco, that has clearly passed through several of these phases. Before 1990,
Morocco was in the phase of repression under the control of King Hassan II. Human Rights
Watch wrote in their 1989 World Report that, “torture and other forms of cruel treatment by
police authorities [were used] to extract confessions from detainees and punish prisoners accused
of both ordinary and political claims."15 However, just one year later, Morocco dramatically
changed its stance on human rights. Human Rights Watch reported in 1990 that, “a number of
developments put human rights in Morocco on the national and international agenda as never
before.”16
This rapid change in Morocco’s stance on human rights is often attributed to the
publication of the book, Notre Ami le Roi by Gilles Perrault. This book includes documentation
of the poor treatment of political prisoners at Tazmamart prison during the reign of King Hassan
II. 17 Its publication served a similar role to that of massacre in the denial phase, because it drew
the attention of the international community to the abuses of the state. It became extremely
popular in Europe, and after its publication, the European Parliament called “for the release of all

14

Risse and Sikkink, “The socialization of international human rights norms,” 34.
Human Rights Watch, Human Rights Watch World Report 1989 – Morocco (New York City: Human Rights
Watch, 1990), https://www.refworld.org/docid/467bb4941e.html.
16
Ibid.
17
Sieglinde Granzer, "Changing Discourse: Transnational Advocacy Networks in Tunisia and Morocco," in The
Power of Human Rights, edited by Thomas Risse, Stephen Ropp and Kathryn Sikkink (Ithaca: Cornell University
Press, 1999), 122 and Gallimard, "GILLES PERRAULT Notre ami le roi," Gallimard, n.d.,
http://www.gallimard.fr/Catalogue/GALLIMARD/Folio/Folio-actuel/Notre-ami-le-roi.
15
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political prisoners.”18 In 1992, the European Parliament also denied an aid package to Morocco
because of its poor human rights record.19 In response to this pressure from above, Morocco
undertook the tactical concessions of forming the Conseil Consultative des Droits de l’Homme
(Advisory Council on Human Rights) in 1990 and establishing the Ministry for Human Rights in
1993.20 Despite these reforms, Morocco is still making similar concessions,21 and torture is still
being practiced.22 Therefore, Morocco is stuck in the tactical concessions phase, and there needs
to be more pressure from above applied on the state. Countries like the United States have
permitted and even encouraged the practice of torture against Islamists in Morocco in order to
benefit their own War on Terror.23.
Contentious Politics
In contrast to the example of Morocco, the “spiral model” alone cannot explain why
Bashar al-Assad has not complied with human rights norms. The original “spiral model” does
not consider human rights campaigns that stem from an uprising like the Damascus Spring and
the Arab Spring. Instead, the original “spiral model” focuses on campaigns that emerge from the
denial phase, which is when a massacre or scandal leads to international mobilization. This event
only mobilizes international actors, as their efforts are necessary in creating a liberal opening

18

Human Rights Watch, Human Rights Watch World Report 1992 - Morocco (New York City: Human Rights
Watch, 1992), https://www.refworld.org/docid/467fca5bc.html.
19
Ottaway Meredith and Marina Riley, "Morocco: From Top-down Reform to Democratic Transition?" Carnegie
Endowment for International Peace, September 2006, https://carnegieendowment.org/files/cp71_ottaway_final.pdf,
6.
20
Granzer, "Changing Discourse,” 124-125.
21
Vera Van Hüllen, "The ‘Arab Spring’ and the spiral model: Tunisia and Morocco," in The Persistent Power of
Human Rights: From Commitment to Compliance, edited by Thomas Risse, Stephen Ropp and Kathryn Sikkink
(Cambridge: University of Cambridge Press, 2013), 188.
22
V-DEM: Varieties of Democracy, “Country Graph,” published by the University of Gothenburg, 2019,
https://www.v-dem.net/en/analysis/CountryGraph/.
23
Aida Alami, "How the persecution of Islamists across North Africa, in the name of fighting terrorism, is sowing
the seeds for future instability," Foreign Policy, April 9, 2010, https://foreignpolicy.com/2010/04/09/moroccosmisguided-war-on-terror-2/ and Aida Alami, "Torture Still Widely Used in Morocco, Amnesty International Says."
The New York Times, May 19, 2015, https://www.nytimes.com/2015/05/20/world/africa/torture-still-widely-used-inmorocco-amnesty-international-says.html.
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through which domestic actors can organize safely and effectively. However, an uprising ignites
domestic and international mobilization simultaneously, and therefore it is different from the
events that are typically associated with the denial phase. Furthermore, the original “spiral
model” does not apply to countries that are engaged in civil war, like Syria after 2011. A
wartime atmosphere changes the state’s mentality, because as R. J. Rummel explains, a war
allows for a state to implement its own nationalist agenda by means of eliminating opposition
forces that have been a long-time threat to the regime. A new cost-benefit analysis develops
whereby the state can justify using violence against the opposition as of part of their wartime
strategy, instead of being forced to rely on negotiation as the only practical option.24 Therefore,
the state is less likely to make reforms when they have the option to physically repress the
opposition.
These additional conditions in Syria require that the theories of contentious politics be
applied to the original “spiral model.” Scholars Doug McAdam, Sidney Tarrow, and Charles
Tilly developed a model of the classic social movement agenda for explaining contentious
politics in Dynamics of Contention. Their model suggests that there are various elements
involved in a contentious action, beginning with a social change. While they do not specifically
define social change, the authors provide the example of the social change that led to the Mau
Mau Revolt in Kenya. The land crisis in Kenya and trend toward decolonization that followed
WWII inspired the armed insurrections of the Kikuyu freedom fighters.25 The fighters were

24

R. J. Rummel, “Democracy, Power, Genocide, and Mass Murder,” The Journal of Conflict Resolution 39, no. 1
(1995): 18, https://www.jstor.org/stable/174320.
25
Doug McAdam, Sidney Tarrow and Charles Tilly, Dynamics of Contention (Cambridge: Cambridge University
Press, 2001), 93-95.
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angry over white immigration and the British Home Office was relaxing their colonial policies,
giving the opposition both the means and motive to mobilize.26
The mobilizing structures generated by a social change include both formal movements
and everyday social networks.27 The purpose of these structures is to frame the movement as an
opportunity for their supporters and a threat to the enemy, which is often the state. The
mobilizing structures create these opportunities and threats via repertoires of contention, which
are defined as, “the array of means by which participants in contentious politics make collective
claims.” 28 The better suited these repertoires are to the given mobilizing structures, the more
effective they will be in creating opportunities for the opposition and threats for the enemy. For
example, if the mobilizing structure was an everyday social network, then social media and
public demonstrations would be good repertoires of contention as they are accessible to a wider
audience. However, something like a newspaper column, which only engages the literate and
affluent, would result in the limited mobilization of an everyday social network.
The classic social movement agenda for explaining contentious politics leaves out
another important element which is discussed later in the book, opportunity and threat spirals.
Opportunity and threat spirals are the continuous loops of environment-changing action taken by
participants in contentious politics.29 If an actor is successful in creating an opportunity for
themselves, then it should increase the size of their mobilizing structure or improve their
communication, providing another opportunity for that movement to take collective action. If an
actor is threatened, then it should decrease the size of their mobilizing structure or fragment their
communication, making it easier for that movement to be threatened again. Since the actions of

26

Ibid.
Ibid, 14.
28
McAdam, Tarrow and Tilly, Dynamics of Contention, 17.
29
Ibid, 243.
27
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one side of a contentious movement change the environment of the other side, ideally, the
opportunities created by a campaign should simultaneously threaten their enemy. Thus, an
opportunity spiral for the opposition, leads to a threat spiral for the state, resulting in the success
of the movement.
With a better understanding of contentious politics, one is now able to combine its key
elements with the phases and actors of the original “spiral model.” This new model will be able
to adequately examine why human rights campaigns have repeatedly failed to prevent the
practice of torture in Syria. This new model begins with the phase of repression, like the original
“spiral model,” but then it moves into the phase of social change. The social change initiates the
onset of two mobilizing structures, which are associated with pressure from below and pressure
from above. The mobilizing structures use repertoires of contention to take collective action. If
these activities generate widespread support, especially among populations that have been loyal
to the state, they should produce opportunity spirals. As the opportunity spirals move on the side
of the opposition, the threat spiral begins within the state. The opportunity and threat spirals
should then pass through three phases; state changes official policy, state changes official
actions, and the absence of human rights violations. These three phases are derived from the last
three phases of the original “spiral model;” tactical concessions, prescriptive status, and ruleconsistent behavior.
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Figure 2: Contentious “Spiral Model”

Repression

Social Change

Pressure from Above

Pressure from Below
Threat
Spiral

Repertories of Contention

Repertories of Contention

State Changes Official Policy
Opportunity
Spiral

Opportunity
Spiral

State Changes Official
Actions

Absence of Human Rights
Violations

12

Methodology
Now that the contentious “spiral model” has been outlined, it can be used to explain the
failures of the human rights campaigns to end torture in Syria. The best way to determine which
aspect of the campaign caused the failure is through a comparative analysis of two different
human rights campaigns to end torture. The factor that changes identically in both models will be
associated with the identical failed outcome in both campaigns. Two prominent human rights
campaigns to end torture during the presidency of Bashar al-Assad were during the 2000
Damascus Spring and the 2011 Arab Spring. Neither one of these campaigns solely focused on
eradicating torture, but they both included movements working to achieve reforms that would
stop the practice. It should be noted that both of these events will be referred to as uprisings, but
that term should not inherently be associated with armed insurrection of violence. Instead, it
means an “instance of rising up” 30 which manifests itself in both political and physical action.
The following figures summarize the contentious “spiral model” during both the Damascus
Spring and the Arab Spring.

30

Merriam Webster, “Uprising,” Merriam Webster, 2020, https://www.merriam-webster.com/dictionary/uprising.

13

Figure 3: Contentious “Spiral Model” during the 2000 Damascus Spring
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Figure 4: Contentious “Spiral Model” during the 2011 Arab Spring
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The model for the Damascus Spring illustrates that Syria existed under the oppressive
leadership of Hafez al-Assad until his death in 2000. This repressive phase was temporarily
disrupted when his son took office and indicated a desire to democratize Syria. However, the
mobilizing structures that developed out of this social change used rather limited repertoires of
contention. The opportunities created for the opposition through their salon discussions and
report writing did not pose a significant enough threat to the regime to start a threat spiral that
would force the state to make reforms beyond basic policy changes. The closure of the prisons is
considered a basic policy change because they were later reopened.31 In contrast, during the Arab
Spring, the social change brought about by the regional uprising in the Middle East created much
more inclusive domestic and international mobilizing structures. The repertories of contention
used by both of these groups appear to better facilitate widespread participation and create
opportunities for the opposition to threaten the state. Large protests, evidence of torture, and
sanctions were all collective actions that legitimately threatened the survival of the Assad
regime. Surprisingly, these actions were still unable to initiate a sustained threat spiral that could
force the state to make legitimate or meaningful reforms. Therefore, in both of the figures,
neither the Damascus Spring or the Arab Spring resulted in an absence of human rights
violations. The measure used to determine the level of improvement is referred to as the Freedom
from Torture Index produced by V-DEM. It is a measure of both the frequency of torture and the
systematic nature of the practice, ranked on a scale of 0 to 4.

31

Anna Barnard, “Inside Syria’s Secret Torture Prisons: How Bashar al-Assad Crushed Dissent,” The New York
Times, May 11, 2019, https://www.nytimes.com/2019/05/11/world/middleeast/syria-torture-prisons.html and The
New Arab, “The darker side of Syria’s Palmyra,” The New Arab. May 21, 2015,
https://www.alaraby.co.uk/english/features/2015/5/21/the-darker-side-of-syrias-palmyra.

16

Figure 5: Freedom from Torture Index (Syria)

Source: V-DEM32
The Freedom from Torture Index shows that there is a slight increase in freedom from
torture following the Damascus Spring in 2000, but there is a severe drop in the index after the
2011 Arab Spring. The minor policy changes that occurred in Syria during 2000 explain the
slight improvement in the index, but in reality, the rating is so low during both uprisings that the
outcome is effectively the same. The main difference between a rating of 1 and 0 is the level of
direct government involvement.33 Given the fact that the outcomes were very similar in both of
the models, the factor that remains the same, in turn, should explain the outcome. However, there
are no constant factors between the two models. The Damascus Spring presented an example of a
movement with weak mobilizing structures and repertories of contention, while the Arab Spring
appeared to have learned from those mistakes and implemented more effective methods.

32

V-DEM: Varieties of Democracy, “Variable Graph,” published by the University of Gothenburg, 2019,
https://www.v-dem.net/en/analysis/VariableGraph/.
33
Ibid.
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Therefore, it appears that there is another factor that has not been accounted for in the
contentious “spiral model.” This would be the factor of foreign alliances that was mentioned
earlier in the introduction. In countries that follow the original “spiral model,” foreign allies
serve the purpose of initiating the tactical concessions phase, and so the more foreign allies a
country has, the more the state will be pressured to make reforms. In Syria, on the other hand, the
more nations that ally with the Assad regime, the less successful the human rights campaign.
This is because while Syria is a weak country in terms of its economy and military, it has great
geopolitical importance in the Middle East. Foreign countries that want influence in the region
need to partner with Syria because of the nation’s geographic location and its relationships with
countries and organizations that fall on both sides of major conflicts in the Middle East. This
dynamic means that Syria’s allies will do almost anything to guarantee the survival of the Assad
regime.
If Syria’s allies protect the Assad regime, then the actions of domestic and international
activists will not have their projected effect on the state, because this assistance destabilizes the
balance of the opportunity and threat spirals. If the opposition threatens the state, then the regime
can use the political, military, or economic assistance of its allies to backlash against the
opposition in response to their actions. The opportunity spiral is no longer environmentchanging, because the state is using artificial means to preserve its environment. Therefore,
effective mobilizing structures can actually result in a weaker campaign, because it will prompt a
backlash that will “break the upward spiral process… [The] domestic human rights movement is
often relatively small and dependent on a handful of key leaders. Arresting or killing these
leaders decapitates the movement and the resulting fear paralyzes it.”34 It should be noted that

34

Risse and Sikkink, "The socialization of international human rights norms,” 25.
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this backlash is not just the outcome of the state generating its own opportunity spiral because if
that was the case, then the state would become less dependent on the assistance of its allies as it
becomes stronger, but that is the opposite of what has occurred.
In fact, Syria’s foreign allies have been the deciding factor in the regime’s survival for
decades. They prevented the onset of the threat spiral within the state during the Damascus
Spring by ignoring the arrests of the movement’s key leaders and the closing of the new forums
and associations. Countries like the United States were aware of the backlash that was occurring,
but they chose to allow it because they needed the support of the Assad regime in other conflicts
in the Middle East. The support of Syria’s allies led to an even worse backlash during the Arab
Spring, because these countries have become directly involved. Nations like Russia, Iran, and
China have not only been giving Syria military equipment, but they have also used their political
power to prevent international intervention to stop the violence. This intensification of support
came as a response to the increased threat to the state posed by the opposition, especially after
the onset of a civil war. The following figure illustrates the contentious “spiral model” with the
additional factor of foreign alliances.
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Figure 6: Contentious “Spiral Model” with the Factor of Foreign Alliances
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The factor for the support of foreign allies is shaped like a magnet, because it attaches
itself to the state and prevents the beginning of the threat spiral. The stronger the alliances, the
stronger the magnet, and the greater the hinderance preventing the commencement of a threat
spiral. Therefore, the state will not be threatened by the actions of the opposition unless its
relationship with its allies’ changes, because the state will have the resources required to deflect
its enemies. The rest of this paper will examine the effect of foreign alliances on the human
rights campaigns in Syria. The next chapter will take a broad look at how Syria’s alliances
affected the success of both the Damascus Spring and the Arab Spring in general. The chapter
will identify the elements of the contentious “spiral model” that were present during each
movement, showing that irrespective of the differences between the two uprisings, Syria’s allies
were able to prevent the onset of the threat spiral. The third chapter will then use this information
to specifically examine how Syria’s allies have prevented the success of human rights campaigns
to end state-sponsored torture.
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Chapter 2: General Application of the Contentious “Spiral Model” to the Damascus Spring
and the Arab Spring

In order to understand why Syria’s allies have had such a profound impact on the ability
of the opposition to achieve reforms, it is necessary to outline the elements of the contentious
“spiral model” during both the Damascus Spring and the Arab Spring. This chapter will directly
compare the elements of repression, social change, mobilizing structures, repertoires of
contention, foreign alliances, and outcomes. It will become clear that the two uprisings
themselves were vastly different. The Damascus Spring was an uprising limited by exclusive
mobilizing structures and ineffective repertoires of contention, whereas the Arab Spring was
characterized by large mobilizing structures that used innovative repertoires of contention.
Nevertheless, the failure of both movements was caused by Syria’s foreign allies. During the
Damascus Spring, these allies ignored the regime’s crackdown which fragmented the movement
beyond repair, and during the Arab Spring, Syria’s allies supported Assad’s backlash both
financially and militarily in order to destabilize the opposition. Therefore, Syrian opposition
groups have been unable to initiate a threat spiral within the state because as soon as they begin
to achieve opportunities, the regime attacks and fragments their mobilizing structures with the
support of its allies.
Damascus Spring
Repression
Before the onset of the Damascus Spring in 2000, Syria existed in a phase of repression
that was characterized by Hafez al-Assad’s tyrannical rule. He came to power in 1970 after
staging a military coup to replace then president, Salah al-Jadid. Hafez al-Assad was once
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described as “a kind of Santa Clause figure who watched over the nation and kept it stable and
independent.”35 Hafez al-Assad achieved such stability by ruling with an iron fist. Human
Rights Watch reported in 1998 that;
The dual legacy of decades of one-party rule and state repression continued to cripple
independent political life in Syria. With emergency law in effect since 1963, peaceful
political expression and association criminalized, and all independent institutions of civil
society long ago dismantled, citizens were unable to exercise basic civil and political
rights guaranteed under international human rights law. The government-controlled print
and broadcast media and the quadrennially elected parliament provided no opportunities
for independent or opposition voices to be heard. Hundreds of members of unauthorized
political opposition groups, imprisoned in the 1980s for nonviolent activities, languished
in prison.36
Hafez al-Assad grounded his authority in a culture of fear among citizens. The scholar,
Lisa Wedeen, termed this environment “as if” culture in her 1998 article on Syria. Wedeen
describes “as if” culture as an external obedience whereby people follow a leader because “the
authority deserves to be obeyed in so far as it is good, wise, beneficent.”37 In Syria, people
voiced their support for the president because if one did not do so then they were subject to
punishment, often in the form of extreme violence. This threat was so high that citizens practiced
the principle of social auto-totality, “meaning that people enforce each other’s obedience,
without believing in what they do.”38 This enforcement was a combination of habit and a desire
to maintain personal safety. Wedeen provides the example that, “taxi drivers [were] avid users of
cult paraphernalia, a practice that is understood by officials and dissidents alike as an effort to
dissuade traffic police from giving drivers tickets.”39 The taxi drivers did not really want to
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display the images but they did so to avoid police harassment, and in turn, their images forced
others to participate in Assad’s cult of personality.
As a result of this culture, the Assad regime seemed untouchable until the 1990s, when
the aging president had to face the reality of succession. Hafez al-Assad had five children, but he
focused on training his eldest son, Basil, until he was killed in a car accident in 1994.40 Hafez
was forced to quickly begin training his second son, Bashar. Bashar al-Assad was very different
from his brother as he had remained outside of politics, studying to become an optometrist.41
Hafez al-Assad died on June 10, 2000, and in turn, Bashar al-Assad was elected as president
after a national referendum and an amendment that changed the law regarding the minimum age
of the president.42
Social Change
The death of Hafez al-Assad ushered in a phase of social change because of Bashar-al
Assad’s weak political reputation and his apparent desire to adopt democratic principles. Bashar
was different from his father because he was young, well-educated, and more closely aligned
with Western culture. However, he was also known to be “awkward and lacked the common
touch necessary to win the loyalty of the population.”43 Therefore, he turned to the tactic of
“commissioned criticism” in order to generate more domestic support. According to long-time
Syria expert, miriam cooke, “at its most basic level commissioned criticism is an official and
paradoxical project to create a democratic façade.”44 This political tool was first employed under
Hafez al-Assad in order to prevent the build-up of popular grievance by allowing selected critical
40
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opinions to be published and shared. For example, the Ministry of Culture would publish some
culturally sensitive books to make citizens feel like they had the ability to choose their own
beliefs, but in reality, the regime carefully chose which radical discussions were in its best
interest.45 Bashar al-Assad implemented “commissioned criticism” by issuing “general amnesties
to political prisoners of all persuasions, the licensing of private newspapers, a shake-up of the
state-controlled media apparatus, the provision of political forums and salons in which open
criticism and dissent was tolerated, and a discarding of the personality cult that surrounded the
previous regime.”46 He allowed for social discourse and even some criticism of the regime so
that the Syrian people would be loyal to him, in light of his limited political background.
However, it will be explained later in this section that the dialogue was heavily regulated by the
Assad regime to prevent it from becoming too dangerous.
This “commissioned criticism” was furthered by Bashar al-Assad’s own statements
concerning the liberalization of the Syrian government. In his 2000 inaugural address, he shared
his thoughts on democracy, and how he wanted to find a type of democracy that was unique to
Syria and not just a mirror image of the West. 47 This massive change in the ideals of the Syrian
government was met with strong international praise. Assad was heralded in newspapers like the
New York Times, which ran stories with headlines such as, “TRANSITION IN SYRIA; Syrians
See in the Heir Possibility of Progress.” Even Madeline Albright spoke about how Bashar alAssad appeared different from his father in terms of being more open to negotiations concerning
Israel.48
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Mobilizing Structures and Repertoires of Contention
With the new environment of change in place in Syria, a group of local activists began to
establish formal mobilizing structures. The resistance of the Damascus Spring began when a
group of Syrian intellectuals, including lawyers, engineers, writers and former members of
Parliament, organized salons or “muntadayat” where they could openly discuss political issues
within civil society. According to scholars at the Carnegie Middle East Center, the most famous
groups of this period were Riad Seif’s National Dialogue Forum and Suhair al-Atassi’s Jamal alAtassi Forum.49 The social change initiated by the “commissioned criticism” plan of Bashar alAssad facilitated these meetings. In addition to the muntadayat, some members of these
discussion groups even formed formal civil society organizations, like the Friends of Civil
Society in Syria.50 The mission statement of this organization was, “to revive the institutions of
civil society and achieve a balance between their role and that of the state in the context of a real
partnership between them in the higher national interest.”51 The members of these salons,
organizations, and other intellectuals produced two documents calling for government reform;
the Statement of 99, demanding political pluralism, and the Statement of 1000, demanding the
end of the 1963 Emergency Law.52 The Emergency Law had been used for decades to justify
arbitrary arrests, detention, and ban the opposition.53
In addition to these internal mobilizing structures, there were also efforts by Syrian exiles
to assist their domestic counterparts. For example, the Statement of 99 was not only signed by
members of the domestic opposition, but a number of exiled Syrian intellectuals and activists
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also endorsed it. It was then published in a newspaper in Lebanon, al-Safir.54 The Statement of
1000 was also leaked to a Lebanese newspaper.55 International mobilization was primarily
limited to the efforts of these Syrian exiles, but some foreign organizations did produce
investigative reports. For example, in 2001, Amnesty International published the report Syria:
Torture, Despair, and Dehumanization in Tadmur Military Prison, which actually led to the
closure of the prison in 2001.56
Despite the fact that these efforts were revolutionary given the preexisting conditions
within Syria, the repertoires of contention utilized to mobilize these domestic and international
structures were not effective in quickly garnering support. The domestic mobilizing structures
primarily depended on the salons and official statements as their means for taking collective
action. Unfortunately, these repertories of contention were limited to highly educated members
of society and those with more time for leisure, deterring lower class citizens and members of
religious and ethnic minorities. For example, among the 99 individuals who signed the Statement
of 99, the most popular professions were poet, researcher, university professor, cinematographer,
and lawyer.57 Therefore, most citizens still demonstrated loyalty to Assad. This loyalty was
clearly expressed in an interview with a voter in the 2000 national referendum who said that, “we
are committed to continuing the legacy of President Assad and his ideology. We are looking
forward to the hopes and promises from Bashar who will continue where his father left off.”58
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Additionally, this loyalty to Assad, while it may not have been completely genuine, was a
result of the high cost of joining the movement. Not only was the campaign exclusive, but
according to Samir Abboud, a professor at Villanova University, the lack of party formation kept
the cost of participating in the forums high, disincentivizing people from joining the
opposition.59 The general amnesties and protections from the government were still not enough
for most Syrian to feel comfortable outwardly rejecting the regime. The movement wanted to
radically reform the government, but given the “as if” culture within the country, the campaign
needed to utilize repertoires of contention that broke the wall of fear. Better repertoires of
contention could have included political parties or large demonstrations that would have publicly
portrayed citizens’ shared frustrations. However, in such a highly repressive society, these
actions would have taken time to develop, something not available to the opposition which
quickly faced regime backlash.

Outcome
The Assad regime began its backlash once it felt the onset of the threat spiral in January
2001 with the publication of the Statement of 1000. This declaration condemned one-party rule
in Syria, and it suggested a number of reforms to both the governing structure and the expression
of individual freedoms.60 This declaration was very ambitious for the opposition, presenting it
with a great opportunity, but it also threatened the authority of the regime. One participant in the
Damascus Spring wrote about the rapid reversal of Assad’s liberal policies in response to the
threat posed by civil society;
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The regime tolerated us for a while, but then got worried. More and more university
students were attending, and the regime thought we were poisoning the minds of the
young generation. So, they banned us. All of a sudden, they called us spies and threw us
in prison. Security cars started following my wife and me, and then forces broke into my
house at 5:30 in the morning and took me away.61
The state initiated a crackdown that included the arrest of ten leaders of the Damascus
Spring in August 2001. According to Human Rights Watch, “two members of parliament,
Ma’mun al-Homsi and Riad Seif … were sentenced by the Damascus Criminal Court to five
years in jail. The other eight activists, Riad al-Turk, `Aref Dalilah, Walid al-Bunni, Kamal alLabwani, Habib Salih, Hasan Sa`dun, Habib `Isa, and Fawwaz Tello, were referred to the
Supreme State Security Court which issued prison sentences between two to 10 years.”62 Even
though only a handful of activists were arrested, the campaign was effectively shut down as a
result of the arrest of the opposition’s main leader, Riad Seif. Many considered Seif to be the true
leader of the movement because of his reputation, popularity, and ability to unify the
opposition.63 Campaigns like the Damascus Spring were attempting to bring together a group of
individuals who had never before associated. It required a well-known and charismatic leader to
mobilize the participants. Once Seif was arrested, the movement began to fragment without his
leadership.
Regardless of the weakness of the movement’s mobilizing structures and repertories of
contention, the Damascus Spring would not have failed so quickly if it was not for this backlash.
The opportunity spiral had commenced with the Statement of 1000, and eventually the leadership
of the movement could have adapted its focus and the methods of the campaign. However, this
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was not possible because the backlash was implemented quickly and intensely in the absence of
protection from external actors. A successful uprising requires that domestic and international
mobilizing structures act simultaneously. This is because domestic actors need the protection of
international countries in order to prevent repression that would fragment the movement before it
has had the time to organize and develop a sustainable framework. While there was some
international assistance during the Damascus Spring, it came from organizations and people who
did not have the ability to stop the regime’s arrests. The countries that needed to sound the alarm
turned a blind eye to Assad’s crackdown because of their own national interests in the Middle
East.
Foreign Alliances
At the time of the Damascus Spring, Syria’s main allies included Western countries and
other Arab states. This relationship began in 1991 after Syria sided with the United States, Egypt
and Saudi Arabia during the first Gulf War against Iraq.64 The first few years of Bashar alAssad’s presidency came with major events in the Middle East, and many of Syria’s allies began
looking to it for assistance. In September 2000, the Second Intifada broke out in violation of the
1993 Peace Accord between Israel and the Palestinian Liberation Organization.65 This led to
extreme violence in the form of “suicide bombings, rocket attacks, and sniper fire.”66 By 2005,
approximately 1000 Israelis and 3200 Palestinians had been killed.67 Syria had the ability to
facilitate an end to this violence because, it was “one of the few countries in the Arab world that
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[could] play—or at least try to play both-- sides of the fence.”68 In 2000, Syria had not signed a
peace treaty with Israel itself, but its efforts in the 1991 Madrid Conference and the Gulf War,
demonstrated that Syria could be “an important conduit to those Arab countries who [had] yet to
sign a peace agreement with Israel.69 Outside of Syria’s involvement in the Second Intifada, after
the 9/11 attacks in 2001, Western nations, particularly the United States, also needed Syria’s help
in collecting intelligence on terrorist activities. Accordingly, “Damascus provided some very
helpful, if not crucial information to U.S. officials regarding al-Qaida members and groups in
order to thwart possible further attacks against American interests in the Middle East.”70
Since Syria was critical to the interests of those involved in the War on Terror and the
Second Intifada, these countries decided to ignore the abuses occurring within the Assad regime
that were stopping the opportunity spiral of the opposition. Countries like the United States were
quickly made aware of the arrests and closures as demonstrated in the contents of the 2001 U.S.
State Department Country Report on Syria.71 Nevertheless, they did not draw international
attention to the issue until it was too late to preserve the movement. Newspapers like The New
York Times, The Guardian, the Times, The Los Angeles Times, and The Chicago Tribune all
published articles discussing the crackdown on the Damascus Spring because they knew it was a
major setback for the movement. Unfortunately, though, many of these articles were published in
2002, after the Damascus Spring came to a close. Syria’s allies focused the public’s attention on
their own national interests because of their need for domestic support at home and a friendly
relationship with Syria and the Assad regime. These countries prevented the opportunity spiral
68
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from extending beyond the achievements of the Statement of 1000. Therefore, even though
Syria’s allies were not directly arresting people, their actions facilitated Assad’s backlash
causing the reversal in civil society reform. The next section on the Arab Spring will begin with
the continued repression of the Assad regime following the Damascus Spring.

Arab Spring
Repression
Human Rights Watch called the years following the Damascus Spring a “wasted
decade,”72 because the promises that Bashar-al Assad made early in his presidency never came
true. Instead, the rights of citizens continued to be limited as depicted in the following data from
Freedom House.
Figure 7: Civil Liberties and Political Rights in Syria 2000-2010
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The blue line represents political rights and the orange line represents civil liberties. Syria
maintained a ranking of 6 or 7 for the entire decade preceding the Arab Spring. A ranking of 7
equals no freedom and 1 equals the most freedom. Assad restricted the freedom of Syrians
through measures like controlling internet access, banning gatherings of more than five people
from discussing political and economic topics, and denying registration of human rights
groups.74 This repression was amplified by the increasing poverty in Syria as a result of a
combination of natural disaster and poor economic policy.
According to The Center for Climate and Security, “from 2006-2011, up to 60% of
Syria’s land experienced, in the terms of one expert, ‘the worst long-term drought and most
severe set of crop failures since agricultural civilizations began in the Fertile Crescent many
millennia ago’.”75 In response to this drought, 800,000 Syrians experienced total crop failure and
moved to the cities.76 Yet, what made this loss even worse was the continued marginalization of
Syria’s poor as a result of privatization and new neoliberal economic policies brought about by
the Assad regime. These policies led to an average increase in GDP of 4.3% per year from 20002010, but this growth left most working-class Syrians behind. The official unemployment rate in
2010 was 8.6%, but as a result of the drought, the actual number was closer to 25%.
Additionally, there was a lack of public services and assistance given to the poor at the same
time that the rich saw more opportunities.77 These economic conditions generated mass
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disillusionment with the government, motivating Syrians to mobilize after the major social
change that swept through the Middle East and North Africa in 2011.

Social Change
On December 17, 2010, a Tunisian street vendor, Mohamed Bouazizi, was harassed by
local police for not having a proper permit to sell fruit.78 His property was confiscated and when
the government failed to help him rectify the issue, he set himself on fire in protest. Thousands
of Tunisians took up his cause and began protesting in the streets. By January 2011, the president
of Tunisia, Zine el-Abidine Ben Ali, was forced into exile after 23 years in office.79 The success
of the Tunisian opposition motivated citizens in other Arab countries to protest against their own
governments. The wall of fear in many Arab countries was broken because the demonstrations
showed that many people did not believe in the state’s propaganda, and that citizens had the
ability to change their country for the better. In other words;
What changed with the fall of Zine el-Abidine Ben Ali in Tunisia was the recognition
that even the worst tyrants could be toppled. It shattered the wall of fear. That is why
hundreds of thousands of Egyptians came into the streets on Jan. 25. It is why protests
broke out in Yemen, Bahrain, Morocco, and Jordan. It’s why Syrians and Libyans took
unfathomable personal risks to rise up against seemingly untouchable despots despite
the near certainty of arrest, torture, murder, and reprisals against their families.80
The regional social change caused by these early demonstrations in countries like Tunisia
and Egypt eventually spread to Syria. This domino-effect is similar to what occurred in Eastern
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Europe in 1989, and using the observations of that movement by the scholar, Timur Kuran, it is
possible to explain how regional social change led to the mobilizing structures in Syria.
Kuran explains that all citizens have a threshold that prevents them from joining the public
opposition. For some people this threshold is very low because of a history of abuse by the
government, but for other people it is very high because they benefit from the regime’s
patronage or protection. Each person’s threshold correlates to a certain level of public
opposition that would cause them to join it. What occurred during the Arab Spring was a
revolutionary bandwagon. It begins when one person has an exceptionally bad experience with
the government, like Bouazizi. His experience forced his threshold so low that he joined the
small public opposition by setting himself on fire. When he committed that act, the public
opposition increased in size so that it equaled the threshold of another person, causing them to
join the public opposition as well. This pattern repeated itself until thousands of people had
taken to the streets in Tunisia. Everyone had joined the public opposition expect for those
people who would always be loyal to the regime.81
The revolutionary bandwagon then spread outside of Tunisia, because the actions of
Bouazizi and the other protestors increased the level of public opposition for each subsequent
country. In Syria, the revolutionary bandwagon began in March 2011 in the city of Daraa after a
group of boys were arrested and tortured for creating anti-regime graffiti. Their brutal treatment
prompted 600 protestors to confront the local governor.82 Figure 8 illustrates just how quickly
the revolutionary bandwagon spread throughout the country. Prior to 2011 there were few
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instances of violent or nonviolent campaigns in Syria. However, in 2011, there were over 3000
instances, and by 2012 this number had more than doubled as the public opposition grew.

Figure 8: Violent and Nonviolent campaigns in Syria
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Mobilizing Structures and Repertoires of Contention
Given the large number of participants in the Arab Spring demonstrations, the mobilizing
structures and repertories of contention used by the Syrian opposition must have been
significantly more effective than those implemented during the Damascus Spring. In the
beginning of the movement, a transnational network was formed that utilized social media in
order to better coordinate the movement and make it accessible to more Syrians. One of the most
widely used social media platforms was Facebook, where the page Syrian Revolution 2011 had
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over 300,000 followers.84 At first, the main participants in these networks lived outside of Syria,
including exiled intellectuals, first-generation immigrants of Syrian dissent, and traditional
opposition groups like the Muslim Brotherhood.85 The networks facilitated the same kinds of
discussions that had occurred during the Damascus Spring, but this time they helped to mobilize
and direct the movement to a much greater degree.86 According to Adam Almqvist, a PhD
researcher at the University of Chicago, “in the early stages of the uprising, the statements
[Syrian Revolution 2011] produced several times a day effectively translated into semi-official
policy for the revolution.”87 Almqvist quotes “Fiddaalidin Al-Sayed Issa, a Sweden-based
activist and leader of Syrian Revolution 2011, [who] said “we guide young people down there.
When we call for a Friday demonstration, people take to the streets – everyone follows. We
determine the dates of the demonstrations with the help of people on the ground’.”88
This social media-based transnational network was an effective repertoire of contention
because by the onset of the Arab Spring, more than 20% of Syrian society was using the internet
according to Figure 9. This meant that many Syrians had the ability to access the mobilizing
structure, which was not the case during the Damascus Spring.
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Figure 9: Internet Use in Syria
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Another effective repertoire of contention used by the opposition, outside of social media,
included the large public demonstrations themselves. A single person would just stand and shout
“God is great” in the street and then hundreds of people would join the public protest.90 People
became obsessed with the experience of protesting, and one man even said that his first
demonstration was better than his wedding day.91 Participants described the protests as very
liberating, and because the demonstrations only required visibility, people could demonstrate in a
variety of ways like simply wearing the same color.92 This repertoire is effective for a population
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that has long been repressed, because as explained in the section on the Damascus Spring, it
lowers the cost of joining the public opposition.
Syrian cities were ideal for these protests as they were densely populated, especially after
the migration that followed the 2008 drought. For example, 200,000 people moved to Aleppo
alone.93 Additionally, since a large number of protestors were Muslim, they were able to use
local mosques as gathering points. 94 In fact, most demonstrations occurred on Fridays after
prayer because the mosques provided a meeting place, and the government did not monitor what
occurred inside of these spaces.95Therefore, new social groups that had been absent during the
Damascus Spring were now joining the opposition.
Most of the protestors came from the populations that endured the worst effects of
Assad’s neoliberal and discriminatory policies. Assad gave political positions, tax breaks, and
economic partnerships to Alawite Syrians, the minority group to which he belonged,
discriminating against Sunni Muslims, who made up 59.1% of the population.96 According to
Joseph Daher, the mobilization of Sunni Muslims is clearly depicted in “the Damascus suburbs
and towns surrounding the capital, where protest was prevalent since the beginning of the
uprising.”97 In addition to Sunni protestors, youth readily joined the movement, because “on the
one hand, the internationalized elites close to the regime had passports, studied abroad, and were
free to purchase imported goods. By contrast, the children of the middle classes, often with
diplomas but without economic capital, and the working classes living in informal settlements,
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saw their standard of living fall.”98 More people were obtaining higher education,99 however, the
number of job opportunities was shrinking for the youth who were not the direct beneficiaries of
the regime’s nepotism. Disillusionment with the Assad regime also motivated women to join the
movement in order to protest against their exclusion from the state’s wealth, and simultaneously
reject their patriarchal society.100
In terms of mobilizing structures, the social media-based transnational network and the
protests primarily relied on everyday social networks. However, the domestic mobilizing
structure also established more formal organizations with the goal of improving coordination and
implementing a nuanced political agenda. Soon after the first protests in March 2011, the
activists began to establish Local Coordination Committees, otherwise known as LCCs. Initially,
the LCCs acted as the facilitators of the protests by doing things like setting up sound systems
and fundraising.101 However, as certain cities began to fall to the opposition, the LCCs formed
Local Councils to take on the new role of governing the area that was no longer under the control
of the regime.102 Therefore, the LCCs established a unified vision of reform in these territories
while carrying out the three main functions of media, relief, and governance.103
In June 2011, some of these LCCs developed even further to create the Syrian Revolution
Coordination Union to unify their work regionally. This group gradually lost power as a result of
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internal division.104 In August, the Syrian Revolution General Commission was established, and
it represented “the Syrian Revolution [Facebook] Page, the Shaam News Network, and the
Syrian Revolution Coordinators Union.”105 However, it also fell to internal division. It was not
until October that the first moderately successful regional organization was established. The
Syrian National Council consisted of LCCs and groups outside of the country including the
Muslim Brotherhood, the Damascus Declaration, the National Bloc, the Kurdish Bloc, the
Assyrian Bloc, and independents.106 This council created a charter to distribute power between
the different organizations in order to replace the authority of the regime in rebel-held
territory.107 The association was quickly accused of being dominated by the Muslim
Brotherhood, and after losing the support of the LCCs, it was forced to join the National
Coalition of Syrian Revolutionary and Opposition Forces. Initially this group had the support of
the LCCs and the Free Syrian Army, but the Coalition eventually also lost the support of these
domestic actors.108
The numerous failures of these formal organizations were the direct result of the state’s
backlash. Security forces fired live bullets into crowds and used teargas on protestors. In just the
second month of the protests, 88 people were killed on a single day.109 Similar to the Damascus
Spring, this repression removed key leaders and organizers that had coordinated the
movement,110 leaving the formal organizations without the ability to unify the various
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components of the opposition. Despite the extreme violence, there was delayed assistance from
the international community. While the transnational network was able to establish an effective
repertoire of contention in the form of social media, foreign countries delayed their collective
action. These nations were not Syria’s key allies at the time but they acted in a similar manner by
prioritizing their personal desire to keep Syria as the source of stability in the Middle East. The
United States implemented a wait-and-see strategy regarding the Syrian Arab Spring.111 They
went even as far as claiming that Bashar al-Assad was a good leader:
On March 28 [2011], U.S. Secretary of State Hillary Clinton described Bashar al-Assad
as different from his late father and predecessor, Hafez, adding that “many of the
members of Congress of both parties who have gone to Syria in recent months have said
they believe he’s a reformer.”112
Consequently, it was not until April 2011 that the U.S. imposed its first round of sanctions
against those responsible for human rights abuses in Syria. However, the U.S. had cut many of
its economic ties with Assad, so this repertoire of contention was not effective in threatening the
regime. The U.S. eventually asked Assad to step down in August,113 but it wanted to maintain the
Syrian security forces and only offer the opposition nonlethal and humanitarian support.114 The
U.S. did little to assist the protestors early in the movement out of fear of destabilizing another
country like Iraq or Libya.
The U.S. was not alone in this hesitancy followed by ineffective support. In the beginning
of the uprisings, the Gulf countries seemed to be coming to the rescue of the Syrian protestors.
Key public figures from Saudi Arabia, Qatar, and Kuwait all supported the Sunni Islamist
movements, as they had done in the other Arab Spring movements like Egypt.115 However, the
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most influential organization, the Arab League, was slow to react; it was not until November
2011 that Syria was formally suspended from the organization.116 This delay in support left the
opposition without protection from foreign countries, and the escalating violence prompted the
opposition to militarize, permanently weakening the movement.117
The first armed rebellion by the opposition occurred in June 2011 at the Turkish border,
and by July the Free Syrian Army had been established.118 Rebel militias lacked unity and
centralization because of “little ideological cohesion,”119 and some of the militias worked in
direct opposition to civil society.120 Additionally, non-Sunni Muslim populations, including
Christians, Druze, and Ismailis, stood with Assad because they feared that if it were not for his
secular regime, then they would be persecuted by a Sunni-dominated government. The extreme
violence used by the predominantly Sunni-rebel militias,121 and their inability to govern rebelheld territory effectively, prompted these groups to support the Assad regime as the lesser of two
evils.122 In general, the onset of the civil war and militarization of the opposition considerably
weakened the aspirations of the political movement.123

Foreign Alliances
While the opposition was able to gain some opportunities, such as the cessation of the
1963 Emergency Law,124 the concessions were limited because Syria’s allies facilitated the rapid
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and intense backlash of the Assad regime. In addition to the hesitancy of some nations like the
U.S. and other Arab countries, there has been direct support of Assad’s violence by countries like
Russia and Iran. The dynamic of Syria’s foreign alliances shifted away from the West in the
decade between the Damascus Spring and the Arab Spring. The following chart depicts the
change in terms of Syria’s economic partnerships by measuring its trade dependency on the West
and several of its allies for the years preceding the Arab Spring. The Trade Dependency Index, or
TDI, is a measure used by the U.S. Department of Agriculture in the early 1990s. It is calculated
by adding imports and exports together and then dividing that sum by the GDP + imports.125 For
the purpose of this research, the measure has been adapted to calculate Syria’s dependence on
any type of trade with the top five importing and exporting Western countries in any given year.
The indices for Russia, China and Iran have also been added separately. China’s involvement in
Syria will be discussed in the next chapter on human rights campaigns to end the practice of
state-sponsored torture.
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Figure 10: Syria, Trade Dependency Index
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In Figure 10, it is clear that Syria was heavily dependent on trade with the West in the
beginning of the 21st century, mainly from Italy, Germany, the United States, and France.128
However, in 2005, this dependency plummeted, reducing Syria’s trade dependency on Western
countries to a level similar to that of Russia, China and Iran. In fact, non-western countries
ultimately took over in trade with Syria, so that by 2008 Syria’s main exporter was Iraq and its
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main importer was China.129 This transition was caused by the West distancing itself from Syria
economically in response to their role in the War in Iraq. In May 2004, the United States
imposed “economic sanctions on Syria over what it [called] its support for terrorism and failure
to stop militants entering Iraq.”130 The West only furthered this retaliation as a consequence of
Syria’s alleged role in the assassination of former Lebanese Prime Minister Rafik Hariri.131
This break down in economic relations between Syria and the West occurred at the same
time that Syria was turning to new military allies as well. After 9/11, Bashar al-Assad
condemned the attacks on the U.S. and stepped up to help in the War on Terror.132 Despite
Syria’s assistance, in 2002, the U.S. declared Syria to be a “rogue state,”133 prompting some
individuals in the Syrian regime to believe that it was the next state to be toppled after Iraq.134
Assad wanted to realign his country against the West, so Syria joined Hezbollah and Iran in
forming the axis of resistance to the American-Israeli bloc.135 In turn, these countries have
supported the Assad regime financially and militarily during the Arab Spring in order to protect
their own national interests in the region.
The involvement of these nations, namely Iran and Russia, is otherwise referred to as
proxy warfare. According to Daniel Byman, a senior fellow at Foreign Policy, proxy warfare
“occurs when a major power instigates or plays a major role in supporting and directing a party
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to a conflict but does only a small portion of the actual fighting itself.”136 Some countries use
proxies in order to limit the cost of the war by using foreign forces who are often better suited for
the environment where the war is being fought.137 However, countries like Russia and Iran fight
proxy wars in order to maintain their dominance in the Middle East. Iran and Russia have both
been directly supplying weapons to the Assad regime in order to assist in its backlash against the
opposition. The following graph shows how Russia has dramatically increased its weapons trade
with Syria since the onset of the Arab Spring. The market has also been dominated by some of
Syria’s other key allies like China and Iran.
Figure 11: Foreign Arms Exports to Syria
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This huge influx in exported weapons has resulted in a more violent and destructive
conflict,139 which is one of the many risks of proxy warfare. According to Byman,
support for a proxy often leads other states to back their own favored horse, worsening
the overall conflict…[and] once the spigot of cash and weapons to a proxy opens up, it is
hard to close…[because] to gain or solidify domestic support for aid, the sponsoring
power often talks up the proxy’s cause and the heroic nature of the fighters, making it
harder to walk away from them. Programs and even entire bureaucracies develop,
creating vested interests in continuing the fight.140
Therefore, Syria’s allies will not withdraw their assistance until the Assad regime has
won the war. They do not care about the crimes that it is committing because Syria plays a key
geopolitical role in the Middle East. Russia’s involvement in Syria is based on both a political
and economic alliance. Russia owns a naval base located in Tartus, Syria, which serves as the
key to Russia’s presence in the Mediterranean.141 Russia has also established a strong trade
relationship with the Assad regime by using Syria as a new market for its investment in cereals
and wheat.142 The two countries even trade heavy construction equipment, oil, and gas.143
Furthermore, Syria has been rewarding Russian companies with major contracts in the energy
and mining sectors.144 Outside of this economic alliance, Russia has also been supporting the
Assad regime in order to prevent U.S. influence in the region. “Moscow considered the possible
overthrow of the Syrian regime a major threat to its own regional interests, viewing such an
outcome as weakening its influence in the region and bolstering the U.S. position and that of its
allies.”145 The anti-American aspect of Russia’s involvement in Syria was evident after reports
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came out in 2018 that, “dozens or even hundreds of Russian fighters were…killed in a failed
attack on a U.S.-Kurdish base in the Deir Ezzor region in support of Assad.”146
Iran has also become involved in Syria for security and economic reasons. Iran has
traditionally used Syria to resupply their ally, Hezbollah, but Iran has now also been using Syria
as a way to connect with the new Iraqi government. Iran has been improving its relationship with
Iraq through projects such as a railway and pipeline that both run through Syria.147 Additionally,
since Syria has long been a pariah state, Iran has also engaged in profitable trade with Syrian
companies and the government. For example, “trade between the two countries grew from
approximately USD 300 million in 2010 to USD 1 billion in 2014.”148 Similar to Russia, Iran has
also been carrying out a proxy war in Syria in order to prevent the country from falling under the
control of Saudi Arabia. Saudi Arabia and Iran have been competing for geopolitical influence in
the Middle East ever since the 1979 Iranian Revolution. Saudi Arabia fears that the revolutionary
ideology that supported the regime change in Iran could be exported to Saudi Arabia.149
According to Hassan Hassan, writing for The National,
For the Gulf States,150 the Syria conflict is thus a critical battle for control of a key pivot
state in the region. Drawing Damascus away from the Iranian camp is seen as a way of
cementing broader regional influence in the Levant, and reestablishing the more
favorable balance of power that they lost following the U.S. occupation of Iraq in
2003.151
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Figure 12 illustrates how the conflict between Saudi Arabia and Iran has captured the
Syrian Civil War. The large green circle represents the Kingdom of Saudi Arabia, the large red
circle represents Iran, and the various lines represent economic and military funding. Saudi
Arabia is funding the Sunni militias including the Free Syrian Army and Islamic fundamentalist
movements,152 while the Iranian military and Hezbollah are assisting the Assad regime.
Furthermore, this Sunni vs. Shia component to the conflict between Saudi Arabia and Iran
transformed a movement for democratization and political reform into sectarian conflict.

Figure 12: Saudi Arabia and Iran in the Syrian Civil War

Source: Vox153
With the help of these allies, the Assad regime has failed to experience a threat spiral that
would force it to make meaningful concessions. The rapid growth of the opposition early in the
uprising, and the trend of other Arab leaders falling to the pressure of these demonstrations,
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threatened Assad’s existence. However, a threat spiral was not able to commence, because when
Assad felt threatened, he was provided with the resources to crackdown on these protesters via
attacks by internal security forces and even warfare. Assad’s allies physically facilitated his
backlash by exporting weapons to Syria and by even sending their own soldiers to fight in the
ensuing civil war. Both Iranian soldiers from the Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps and
Russian mercenaries have been directly involved in the conflict. This militarization led to the
fragmentation of the opposition’s mobilizing structures by shifting its focus from
democratization to warfare, delegitimizing the movement and killing its key leaders and
activists.154
Outcome
The conflict in Syria is still ongoing, and since the beginning of the Arab Spring, 560,000
Syrians have been killed.155 The concessions made by the Assad regime have been limited to the
lifting of the 1963 Emergency Law, the legalizing of appropriate peaceful demonstrations, and
the abolishment of the state security courts.156 These reforms do not illustrate policy changes,
because immediately after they were enforced, more repressive measures were adopted. The state
never went beyond these 2011 concessions, because of the fragmentation of the opposition via
the support of Syria’s allies. The opportunity spiral of the opposition was stymied, and the Assad
regime has been able to reclaim most of the territory it had lost to the rebels. The following map
shows that as of October 2019, the Syrian rebels only controlled Idlib province.
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Figure 13: Current State of the Syrian Civil War

Source: The Washington Post157
Despite Assad’s victories, the Syrian government has sustained serious damage as a
result of the war. According to World Vision, currently “about 5.6 million Syrians are refugees,
and another 6.2 million people are displaced within Syria. Nearly 12 million people in Syria need
humanitarian assistance.”158 Much of Syria has also been physically destroyed, and the country
ranked 4th on the 2019 Fragile States Index, which measures a country’s ability to manage and
prevent conflict.159 While Russia and Iran have prevented the collapse of the Assad regime,
Syria’s survival is dependent on its ability to reintegrate itself into the global economy and
international politics. Otherwise, Syria will not have the resources to rebuild. Some Arab
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countries have accepted Bashar al-Assad as the leader of Syria, with the Arab League preparing
to invite him back and the United Arab Emirates reopening their Syrian embassy.160
However, other countries like Qatar, Saudi Arabia, and the United States are still cautious
about working with Assad.161 These countries do not have enough power to remove Assad from
office, but they could potentially force Assad to make some reforms in the future. Therefore,
while the mobilizing structures of the Arab Spring are largely ineffective now, there are other
actors, both domestic and international, that have the ability to pressure the state if the right
repertories of contention are found. One potential repertoire is introduced in the next chapter,
where the failures of the human rights campaigns to end torture during both the Damascus
Spring and the Arab Spring are specifically discussed in detail.
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Chapter 3: Why the Human Rights Campaigns to End Torture in Syria Failed

The previous chapter examined how Syria’s allies affected the outcomes of the uprisings
during both the Damascus Spring and the Arab Spring. This chapter will attempt to apply that
same methodology to the human rights campaigns to end the practice of state-sponsored torture
in Syria. Since the two campaigns have already been examined extensively on their own, this
chapter will directly compare each element of the contentious “spiral model” during both
periods. The analysis will show that the Damascus Spring implemented weak mobilizing
structures and indirect repertoires of contention, because of the wall of fear that was established
during the presidency of Hafez al-Assad. On the other hand, the Arab Spring saw the
mobilization of organizations that implemented effective repertoires of contention in response to
a dramatic change in the scale of torture used by the regime. Irrespective of the differences
between these two campaigns, both movements failed as neither achieved a meaningful
improvement in the Freedom from Torture Index. The factor that remained the same during both
periods was the interference of Syria’s allies, designating it as the causal factor of the failed
outcomes. Syria’s allies facilitated backlash against the opposition by ignoring the abuses of the
regime in 2000 and by exporting weapons to Syria during the 2011 Civil War. Since the onset of
the Arab Spring, these allied countries have also used their power in international political
systems to render the traditional means used to condemn torture unavailable. Fortunately,
though, a new mobilizing structure has developed that promises future reform because it utilizes
a repertoire of contention that functions independently of Syria’s allies.
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Repression
The repression that proceeded both the Damascus Spring and the Arab Spring was
characterized by severe restrictions to individuals’ civil liberties and political rights. However,
there was a major difference between the psychological effect of the repression proceeding the
Damascus Spring and the Arab Spring. In 2000, Syrians were terrified of the state’s capacity to
attack its own citizens as a result of the 1982 Hama massacre. The fear brought about by this
incident was absent in the younger generation that participated in the Arab Spring. They did not
remember the massacre, and so they were more willing to follow the trend of regional social
change in 2011.
The Hama massacre had the capacity to paralyze the opposition and the public at large
during the Damascus Spring because of the horrific extent of its violence. In 1982, tens of
thousands of people were killed in response to an armed uprising of 200-500 armed Muslim
Brotherhood fighters.162 One participant in the Arab Spring wrote about the way in which his
father was impacted by the massacre:
My aunt was pregnant at the time. My parents took her to the hospital. They had to stop
at the checkpoints on the way there and saw corpses lined along the road. My father
carries that sight inside him until now. He still has that fear until this day. Whenever we
watched anything on TV related to politics, he’d say, “Turn off the television!” He
couldn’t even bear to watch a political TV show—that’s how afraid he was.163
This fear of a similar government response to opposition activity kept people from mobilizing
against the regime in 2000 and 2001. However, when the Arab Spring swept through Syria,
many people, especially of the younger generation, did not share this memory. Bashar al-Assad
did not have the same legacy of violence as his father before the Arab Spring. The following
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table records the number of deaths due to torture between 2000 and 2007 from the U.S. State
Department Country Reports. After 2007, the reports stopped calculating a total number of
victims every year.

Figure 14: Instances of Death due to Torture in Syria 2000-2007
Year

Number of Deaths due to Torture

2000

0

2001

3

2002

0

2003

1

2004

8

2005

4

2006

1

2007

3

Source: Section A. Arbitrary or Unlawful Deprivation of Life in the U.S. State Department
Country Reports 2000-2007164
It should be noted that there was no independent monitoring of Syrian prisons, so these numbers
are most likely lower than in reality.165 Nevertheless, the small number of torture-related deaths
and the closure of both Tadmur and Mezze prison166 during the Damascus Spring, meant that
before the Arab Spring, there were less reasons to fear backlash from Bashar al-Assad.
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Social Change
The fact that people were more scared of the regime during the Damascus Spring also
explains the limited social change that occurred. An increase in the scale of torture is often the
social change that leads to the mobilization of human rights campaigns to end the practice of
state-sponsored torture. There was little change in the scale of torture in 2000 because the state
was able to control the opposition through its policies of “commissioned criticism.” The
movement did not make truly revolutionary demands out of fear of government reprisal, and so
the regime was able to silence the opposition through a few arrests and closures. However,
during the Arab Spring the scale of torture dramatically increased because the threat posed by the
opposition also increased. People were no longer afraid of the state, and so the Assad regime
needed to use mass violence in order to force citizens into submission. This section will compare
the changes in the scale of torture that occurred during both the Damascus Spring and the Arab
Spring.
Amnesty International has published two major reports concerning torture in Syrian
prisons shortly after the Damascus Spring and during the Arab Spring; the first in 2001 on
Tadmur prison, and the second in 2016 on Saydnaya prison. These reports include testimonies
from survivors of the prisons. In the 2001 report, there are testimonies from prisoners who were
interned both before and after the onset of the Damascus Spring. This first example is from a
prisoner interned from 2000-2001, and it details how prisoners were tortured when they initially
arrived at the prisons.
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After getting off the bus at the prison of Tadmur we were ordered to cover our
heads with towels, or pull our shirts over our heads. We then marched through the
prison gate with our heads covered and our hands tied behind our backs. During
the first day we completed registration formalities. On the following day we were
assembled for the official ‘reception party.’ When it was my turn, I was ordered to
lie on my stomach…. They then tied my feet to an iron bar with a chain and raised
my legs up. Four boards pressed on my back with their feet to make sure that I
didn’t move. I was then whipped probably over 200 times with a cable until I lost
consciousness. 167
The second example is from a prisoner interned from 1996-1999, and their account
illustrates the torture that occurred on a daily basis.
Punishments were numerous and varied in Tadmur and one did not need to
commit a particular offence to be harshly penalized. If the guard at the ceiling saw
a prisoner moving his hand or leg or make any movement while asleep, he would
ask the prisoner on shift to “mark” that person (marking means singling out a
prisoner for future punishment). Punishments were normally carried out after
breakfast and usually ranged from 50 to 200 lashes, depending on the overall
conditions in the prison.168
The two quotes detail different methods of torture, but they illustrate that there was a
similar sense of order to how torture was administered in Tadmur Prison both before and during
the Damascus Spring. This violence targeted particular members of the opposition that posed the
greatest threat to the regime. For example, the Amnesty International report claims that “those
held in connection with Islamist groups or the pro-Iraqi Ba’th party [were] said to bear the brunt
of the most severe forms of torture.”169 Therefore, the scale of torture that was occurring during
the first part of Bashar al-Assad’s presidency appears to have been similar to that used by his
father. In fact, the condition of torture actually improved as the prison population dropped from
14,000 in 1997 to 11,829 in 2003, causing the prison system to operate below full capacity.170
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Since people were living in fear of the legacy of the Hama massacre, few citizens acted in a way
that posed a threat to the regime that would require more violence and torture. This was the
condition of torture preceding the Arab Spring.
However, the scale of torture radically changed in 2011, becoming widespread and
focused on extermination. Even the title of the Amnesty International report in 2016
demonstrates the evolution of torture in Syria, “Human Slaughterhouse: Mass Hangings and
Extermination at Saydnaya Prison Syria.” Amnesty International wrote the following report on
the treatment of prisoners in Saydnaya Prison after the beginning of Arab Spring and Civil War:
There are two detention centers at Saydnaya Military Prison, which may hold
between 10,000 and 20,000 people. In the “red building”, the majority of
detainees are civilians who have been arrested since the beginning of the crisis in
2011. In the “white building”, the majority of detainees are officers and soldiers
in the Syrian military who have also been arrested since 2011. Thousands of
people detained in the red building have been killed in secret extrajudicial
executions, after being held in conditions amounting to enforced disappearance.
The killings have taken the form of mass hangings. Before they are hanged, the
victims are condemned to death in “trials” at the Military Field Court located in
the al-Qaboun neighborhood of Damascus, which last between one and three
minutes. On the day the prison authorities carry out the hangings, which they refer
to as “the party”, they collect the victims from their cells in the afternoon. The
listed detainees are told that they will be transferred to a civilian prison. Instead,
they are brought to a cell in the basement of the red building, where they are
severely beaten over the course of two or three hours. In the middle of the night,
they are blindfolded and transferred in delivery trucks or minibuses to the white
building. There, they are taken into a room in the basement and hanged. This
takes place once or twice a week, and on each occasion between 20 and 50 people
are hanged to death.171
These mass hangings differ greatly from the torture previously used in Tadmur
prison, yet it is still torture because of the element of purposefully inflicted suffering by
state officials. Instead, of the torture being used to extract confessions or threaten
Islamists, the use of violence is clearly intended to physically exterminate the opposition
171
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as a whole. This new goal is reflected in the dramatic increase in the number of prisoners
killed in detention as the result of torture.172 In 2011, “the Syrian Network for Human
Rights reported that 1,215 Syrians, including 34 children and 17 women, died from
torture during detention by the government authorities.”173 This number is dramatically
higher than the previous total number of torture-related prison causalities. The scale of
the torture experienced in Syria since 2011 is more similar to a massacre than the torture
practiced previously by the Bashar regime. It is focused on eliminating the opposition as
a whole because of the threat posed by the new mobilizing structures. The opposition was
no longer just made up of a few dissidents, and as the outcomes of the other protests in
Tunisia and Egypt suggested, this movement had the potential to take down the regime.
The onset of the civil war only furthered the danger posed by the opposition and newly
militarized forces.
Therefore, in order to maintain regime strength and get rid of a quickly growing
opposition, the state moved to carrying out a massacre to scare citizens into submission in
a manner similar to that of the 1982 Hama massacre. The level of dissidence Hafez alAssad faced in 1982 was also unprecedented, and the state needed to quickly show that it
was in control.174 The regime turned to using a massacre because, despite the arrest of
thousands of Muslim Brotherhood members, torture was not working to dissuade them
from challenging the regime. States use torture to prevent dissidence by threatening
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violence, however once the public is no longer afraid of that violence, torture does little
to suppress a movement.

Mobilizing Structures and Repertoires of Contention
The presence of a wall of fear and the change in the scale of torture during the
two movements is important to the formation and success of their human rights
campaigns working to end torture, because these factors changed how actively the
opposition mobilized around the issue. Since there was limited change to the frequency
and practice of torture during the Damascus Spring, the mobilizing structures indirectly
fought against torture in order to avoid regime backlash. However, since the scale of
torture dramatically increased in response to the Arab Spring protests, the opposition
actively mobilized to end the practice of torture by collecting evidence of the abuses.
In general, the mobilizing structures established during the Damascus Spring were
limited to formal organizations ushered in by the liberal opening created by Bashar al-Assad in
2000. Under Hafez al-Assad, there was intense monitoring of civil society, and NGO activity
was limited to charities and religious organizations that did not perform advocacy work.175
However, according to Freedom House, “Syria received an upward trend arrow [in 2000] due to
a small relaxation of controls over freedom of assembly and freedom of expression.”176 Under
Bashar al-Assad, Human Rights Watch reported that a number of new associations were able to
form, like human rights organizations.177 These new mobilizing structures included the Syrian
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Human Rights Association and the Defense of Democratic Freedoms and Human Rights.178
Other groups like the Committees of the Defense of Democratic Freedoms and Human Rights in
Syria resumed their activities.179 These organizations were assisted by the release of human
rights activists from Syrian prisons by Bashar al-Assad. 180
Nevertheless, there was an absence of organizations with a significant focus on
stopping torture. Instead, the opposition targeted issues that facilitated torture, such as the
release of political prisoners and the cessation of the 1963 Emergency Law. The
Statement of 99 and the Statement of 1000 also did not explicitly ask for an end to the
practice of torture.181 The opposition passively used their repertoires of contention to
advocate for the issue of torture because they “were wary of a regime that could still
pounce on them in a heartbeat if necessary and aware that they did not want to provoke
Bashar al-Asad too much.”182 Calling out the Assad regime for the practice of statesponsored torture would have been too negative of a criticism, and so they asked for the
“sugar-coated”183 reforms instead. The legacy of the Hama massacre and the regime’s
potential for backlash kept the opposition from being too revolutionary. Additionally,
since the scale of torture remained the same during that period, the opposition did not feel
as though it was necessary to address the issue immediately.
However, during the Arab Spring, because the scale of torture was much greater
and the people were no longer afraid of the state, the campaign to end the practice of
torture led to widespread mobilizing structures. More people were being impacted by the
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state’s violence and they now had the courage to speak out against it. In contrast to the
Damascus Spring, the Arab Spring saw the onset of large demonstrations intended to
bring awareness to the state’s abuses, like the protests in Daraa that started after the
torture of a group of young people. These demonstrations relied on everyday social
networks and implemented repertoires of contention such as social media and public
protests. Unfortunately, the demonstrations led to more violence, and so the human rights
campaign to end the practice of torture turned toward formal mobilizing structures that
relied on the repertoire of contention of evidence collection. Some of these formal
structures include the Violation Documentation Center in Syria, the Syrian Center for
Statistics and Research, and the Syrian Network for Human Rights.184
These organizations quickly gained supporters as they were less dangerous than
the protests because they focused on documenting the abuses of the Assad regime,
instead of removing Assad from office. The repertoire of evidence collection was
effective because of the growing scale of torture in Syria, and the vast amount of
evidence it produced. People were also easily able to participate in the movement by
documenting the violence that they witnessed with the technology available to them. In
the year leading up to the Arab Spring, 11,696,000 Syrians had a mobile phone
subscription.185 This number is significantly higher than the 30,000 Syrians who had a
mobile phone subscription at the time of the Damascus Spring. Individuals who used
their phones and personal cameras to document regime violence were referred to as
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citizen journalists. Citizen journalists “began to work spontaneously as they started
filming the events they witnessed using their phone and digital cameras, later sending
images to revolution pages on Facebook.”186
Collecting physical evidence of state-sponsored torture was harder than
documenting the brutality of the state, because unlike the public protests, torture occurred
inside of military detention centers. However, the security forces occasionally returned
the bodies of torture victims, allowing for images of the torture to be widely shared. For
example, the body of Hamza al-Khatib, “a thirteen-year-old who was killed in regime
custody,” was returned home, and photos and videos of his tortured body were widely
viewed online and shared with the media.187 Another example of this work includes the
documentary, For Sama, which was filmed by a resident of Aleppo, Waad al-Kateab, and
produced in partnership with PBS Frontline. While this film was not first published on
social media, the method for capturing the footage was identical to that of the citizen
journalists. In one scene, al-Kateab records residents of Aleppo waking up to over thirty
bodies in the nearby river. Her husband, a doctor, examined the bodies and said they were
victims of torture and execution.188 On YouTube alone, the film has over 111,715 views
as of April 2020, and it won Best Documentary at the British Academy of Film
Awards.189
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The collection of this physical evidence of torture has generated more support for
the campaign, especially among foreigners, as human rights movements are directly
posting these images on Facebook, YouTube, and other Western media sources. For
example, Amnesty International made a video about Saydnaya prison, “Inside Saydnaya:
Syria’s Torture Prison,” and it has 300,337 views on YouTube as of April 2020.
However, the most important outcome of the collection of this physical evidence is its
potential use in future legal cases to hold members of the Assad regime accountable for
their crimes. According to the European Center for Constitutional and Human Rights,
“the first trial worldwide about state torture in Syria is expected to start in Germany in
2020.”190
Trials like this one in Germany are the work of a new transnational network that
has formed between the Syrian NGOs collecting physical evidence of torture and the
European court system. The European Center for Constitutional and Human Rights has
been coordinating the network with the help of Syrian human rights lawyers, like Anwar
al-Bunni, a survivor of torture himself.191 This transnational network has become an
effective mobilizing structure for the human rights campaign to end the practice of statesponsored torture, because it relies on the repertoires of contention of evidence gathering
and the court system. As previously explained, evidence gathering is an effective
repertoire because it allows for widespread participation and generates outside interest in
the movement. The repertoire of the court system is equally as effective, because the
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outcome of the trials carries political weight, which will impact the Assad regime as it
attempts to return to engaging in trade and political negotiations with the international
community. If Assad wants to work with other countries, especially those where the cases
are being held, then he will be pressured to comply with the findings of the court.
For this first trial, the German Federal Court has arrested two members of the
Syrian General Intelligence Directorate, Anwar R. and Eyad A. These two men both “left
Syria in 2012 and applied for asylum in Germany,” despite their criminal histories.192
European courts are able to prosecute the cases because of the principle of universal
jurisdiction. Germany is one of the best legal forums in which to use this principle,
because it practices pure universal jurisdiction, which means that it can prosecute any
case concerning genocide, crimes against humanity, or war crimes without the case
having any direct tie to Germany.193 Additionally, since many former Syrian officials
have fled to Germany, it is easier for the German courts to arrest these individuals and
physically bring them to trial.194
The plaintiffs, fourteen victims of Syrian torture, are using their testimonies and
accusations as the basis of their claims.195 However, the credibility of hearsay evidence
can often be challenged in court,196 so “in addition to the testimonies of the victims,
photographical evidence, and metadata, numerous public documents and reports have
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also been used as sources for the criminal complaints.”197 One of the largest sources of
this physical evidence is the Caesar Files. In August 2013, a former military
photographer for the Assad regime, code-named Caesar, stole more the 50,000 images
documenting the systematic torture and extermination of Syrians within military
detention centers. He gave the images to the Syrian National Movement, who then gave
them to Human Rights Watch.198 The images were examined by medical professionals
who were able to identify the cause of death and types of torture used on the victims.199
These images are particularly helpful to the case because they contain metadata, which
provides very specific details about the image including the date and location of the
photo.200
Despite the great potential of these trials, this mobilizing structure does have some
drawbacks. For example, these new transnational networks are targeting former officers close to
Assad because they are unable to prosecute Assad and his closest officials given the principle of
diplomatic immunity established in the Arrest Warrant case.201 This case set the precedent that
sitting heads of state and high-level government officials cannot be prosecuted for offenses, even
those like genocide.202 Only once an official has left office can they be prosecuted for these
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crimes. Therefore, as long as Assad is in power he will be immune to arrest. Nevertheless, there
is still future potential because the available evidence will only continue to grow, and it utilizes a
repertoire of contention that stands out as one of the only ways for the opposition to take
collective action without the influence of Assad’s allies.

Foreign Alliances
Just like during the greater Damascus Spring and Arab Spring uprisings, the influence of
Syria’s allies prevented the success of the human rights campaigns to stop torture. During the
Damascus Spring, Syria’s allies were able to steer international attention away from Assad’s
abuses, preventing international mobilization against the state’s backlash. There were eventually
reports on the regime’s crackdown, but they came too late to offer the opposition any protection.
This is the same argument made in the previous chapter, because the campaign to stop the
practice of torture was directly incorporated into the general movement. During the Arab Spring,
on the other hand, the export of weapons to Syria has led to extreme violence against the
opposition that has weakened the campaign to stop the practice of torture. Syria’s allies have also
used their own power in international political and legal organizations to prevent other countries
from taking-action to stop the crimes against humanity.
As previously mentioned, while much of the campaign’s weakness during the Damascus
Spring was caused by its own exclusive mobilizing structures and ineffective repertoires of
contention, Syria’s allies also did not support the movement in order to protect their own national
interests. Just a simple internet search shows that the international community was aware of what
was going on in Syria in terms of both the state’s continued use of torture and the backlash
against Damascus Spring. There were reports from Amnesty International, Human Rights Watch,

68

and the U.S. State Department claiming that the Syrian regime frequently used torture during the
time period of the Damascus Spring. Additionally, when members of the Damascus Spring were
arrested, groups like Human Rights Watch and the U.S. State Department even called out the
Assad regime for its limited liberalization.203 However, most of these reports and other attention
from the media was published well after the arrests and closures that fragmented the campaign.
International actors failed to mobilize simultaneously with domestic actors because they
needed Assad’s assistance at the same time that he was beginning his domestic backlash. The
Arab world was swept up in the Second Intifada, and the Arab League needed Syrian support for
its 2002 Peace Plan.204 The U.S. also needed Syria’s help in collecting intelligence for its War on
Terror. If international and domestic actors do not work together, then the domestic actors are
vulnerable to the repression of the state. The Syrians working on the ground needed the
protection of foreign countries to ensure that they were able to mobilize to the point where they
could sustain an attack. However, the Damascus Spring movement lacked this protection, and so
the backlash of the regime prevented major progress in the field of human rights. Before the
international movement drew awareness to Syria’s backlash in late 2001 and 2002, the Syrian
government implemented changes to civil society such as requiring organizations hosting
meetings to receive extensive approval ahead of time.205 Such restrictions prevented a new major
development in human rights until 2004 with the establishment of a Syrian branch of the Arab
Organization for Human Rights in Syria.206
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It cannot be forgotten that one reason that these campaigns were so easily silenced, was
because they failed to directly act on the issue of torture. The blind spot in the movement’s
advocacy was caused by their desire to avoid pushing the regime too far. However, even when
there was physical evidence of torture and human rights based-sanctions coming from foreign
countries during the Arab Spring, Syria’s international allies continued to protect the Assad
regime and further the practice of torture. Syria’s main allies in this period have consisted of
Russia and Iran, who have been giving Syria billions of dollars in military aid to support Assad’s
suppression of the opposition. According to the Chatham Institute;
At the peak of its military intervention in 2015, IHS Jane estimated the cost of the
Russian involvement at $2.4 million–$4 million a day, this amounts to $2.5 billion–$4.5
billion since September 2015. In comparison, the US State Department estimates that Iran
has spent over $16 billion in Syria since 2012. According to Ali Akbar Velayati, a senior
adviser to Iran’s Supreme Leader in international affairs, Tehran provides $8 billion a
year to support the Syrian regime’s survival, amounting to $48 billion over the same
period.207
While it is hard to calculate the exact monetary value of the assistance from Iran and Russia, it is
obvious that in a country with a total GDP of just over $50 billion in 2017, the billions of dollars
that Iran and Russia have invested in the war has had a significant impact on Syria.208 Their
assistance has facilitated the fragmentation of the human rights movement by killing its members
and worsening the condition of torture in Syria that these groups have tried to improve.
Countries like Russia and Iran do not care that Assad is committing these crimes
because of their vested interest in Syria, and their own poor human rights records. The
U.S. State Department found that in Russia, there were reports that “security forces used
torture as a form of punishment against detained opposition and human rights activists,
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journalists, and critics of government policies.”209 Additionally, in Iran, torture is used as
punishment for participating in protests, practicing Sunni Islam, opposing the
government, and other security issues.210 Figure 15 illustrates the Freedom from Torture
in countries allied with Syria and in other countries that are important to the region.

Figure 15: Freedom from Torture of Syria’s Allies

Source: V-DEM211
The top cluster, or the countries who use the least amount of torture, are Germany,
France, the United States, and Italy. The bottom cluster, or the country that uses the most torture,
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is Syria. The middle cluster, or the countries that use less torture than Syria but significantly
more than the top cluster, are Russia, Iran, and China.212 China is included in this graph because
their economic relationship with Syria has prompted them to protect Assad and further the
practice of torture. What this graph shows, is that Syria’s key allies have a poor record of torture
themselves, so they do not have a moral obligation to stop the torture in Syria. Therefore, no
matter how great the pressure from domestic or international actors like Amnesty International,
Human Rights Watch, and the ECCHR, as long as Syria plays an important role in the conflicts
and economy of the Middle East, Russia, Iran, and China will protect the Assad regime with
financial, military, and legal support.
Furthermore, Syria’s alliances with Russia and China are of particular concern, because
these nations hold enormous power in the international political bodies that provide some of the
only ways to stop crimes against humanity. Since Russia and China hold veto power in the UN
Security Council, they have been able to block resolutions that condemn Syria’s torture. While
China has not been actively involved in the civil war, because of their economic relationship
with Syria they had been helping Russia protect the Assad regime. Amnesty International voiced
their frustration concerning the situation in the following statement by Sherine Tadros, head of
UN office in New York for Amnesty International:
For six years Russia, with the support of China, has blocked Security Council decisions
that would have punitive consequences for the Syrian government. This behavior
prevents justice and emboldens all parties to the conflict in Syria to act with indifference
to international law. The message coming from the international community is that when
it comes to Syria, there are no red lines.213
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The Russia’s veto power had also prevented the International Criminal Court from becoming
involved in the issue until the first cases against Syria were filed in 2019.214 Syria has been
immune to the court’s jurisdiction, because it is “not a party to the Rome Statute (the ICC’s
governing treaty) [and] the only other means by which the ICC could investigate alleged crimes
committed in Syria is via a United Nations Security Council referral… [However,] Russia a
strong ally of the Assad regime, has vetoed or threatened to veto all efforts by the Security
Council to refer the situation in Syria to the ICC.”215
It should be noted that there have been a number of countries that have pressured the
Assad regime to stop using torture. For example, on December 20, 2019, the United States
passed the Caesar Syria Civilian Protection Act of 2019, which “provides for sanctions and
travel restrictions on those who provide support to members of the Assad regime, in addition to
Syrian and international enablers who have been responsible for, or complicit in serious human
rights abuses in Syria.”216 Nevertheless, this action was not effective because Syria is not
economically dependent on the West.
Therefore, the Assad regime is viable as long as Russia, Iran, and China maintain their
financial, military, and legal support, which seems likely because of the other countries that have
become involved in the civil war, like Saudi Arabia and the United States. Assad will not turn on
its allies because he needs them, and his allies will not turn on Assad for fear of losing economic,
political, and ideological dominance in the region. Therefore, regardless of the effectiveness or
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ineffectiveness of the human rights campaign to stop torture, the movement will fail as long as
Syria has strong foreign alliances.

Outcome
As explained previously in this paper, both the Damascus Spring and the Arab Spring
were not successful movements, and the campaigns to stop torture were no exception. If one
refers back to the Freedom from Torture Index, it is clear that despite the efforts of domestic and
international activists, the Assad regime still frequently practiced torture during and after both
uprisings.
Figure 16: Freedom from Torture Index 1994-2019

Source: V-DEM217
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There was a slight improvement in the Freedom from Torture Index during the Damascus
Spring as a result of prisoner releases and the closure of several detention centers.
However, these concessions were state-sponsored, and the domestic movement did little
to expand on these reforms out of fear of backlash. Therefore, these improvements were
not significant enough to prevent the regime from using torture as a means to stop the
opposition during the Arab Spring. Assad’s backlash against these protestors has led to
the death of more than 104,000 people by torture in Syrian detention centers. 218 The fact
that the state has been using torture as the means by which it attacks the opposition has
created a major challenge for the campaigns working to end the practice of torture in
Syria. Not only must they work harder to keep up with the ever-increasing number of
abuses, but their own organizations are losing members and critical leaders.219 The
involvement of Syria’s allies has only furthered complicated the movement’s work by
preventing the opportunities that the opposition gains from initiating a threat spiral within
the state. Assad has been able to backlash against the opposition whenever he feels
threatened because of the physical resources coming from his allies and the legal
protection they offer. The comparison of the Damascus Spring and the Arab Spring
shows that the only factor these two movements have in common is the interference of
Syria’s allies, and so it is the causal factor that led to the similar outcome in both periods.
However, it would be misleading to say that the campaign has died. Organizations
like the Syrian Network for Human Rights are still documenting the names of victims of
torture. They have already recorded the names of 13,608 people who died from torture
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inside Syrian detention centers between March 2011 and August 2018.220 The evidence
they are collecting is allowing for a transnational network to begin holding former
members of the Assad regime accountable in the court of law. The trials in Germany have
the potential to begin a very successful opportunity spiral, because the more officials who
are tried and found guilty, the more pressure that will be placed on the Assad regime.
Since the trials use the repertoire of contention of a court system based on the principle of
universal jurisdiction, Assad’s allies will be unable to stop the trials. The trials may even
weaken Syria’s foreign alliances as other countries fear being found complicit in Assad’s
crimes. Therefore, the human rights campaign to end torture in Syria is far from over, and
the outcome must be reevaluated after the movement has had time to fully implement this
new mobilizing structure and its repertoires of contention.
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Conclusion
The reports that have come out of Syria since the beginning of the Arab Spring in 2011
have shocked the world with their level of brutality. It is now clear why Amnesty International
included the quote, “Saydnaya is the end of life- the end of humanity”221 in their 2016 report.
However, this research has proven that this is not the first time that the Assad regime has acted in
this manner. Instead, the state has been able to torture its citizens for half a century with little to
no repercussions. There have been uprisings and human rights campaigns that have tried to
improve the situation in Syria. The 2000 Damascus Spring was able to mobilize a small group of
Syrian intellectuals and international actors around the idea of democratization when Bashar alAssad first became president. Then the 2011 Arab Spring generated widespread domestic
support of regime change and protecting human rights by securing the alliance of both
international organizations and Western nations. Nevertheless, both movements failed to achieve
reforms because Assad’s loyal allies have propped up his regime and facilitated the backlash that
has fragmented these campaigns.
According to the “spiral model,” the activism that took place during both of these
movements should have achieved increased freedom from torture because the pressure from
above and pressure from below should have motivated the state to comply with human rights
norms. This was the pattern observed in other countries, including Morocco, after experiencing a
similar level of pressure. However, the original “spiral model” could not accurately predict the
outcome of these uprisings, because uprisings mobilize domestic and international actors at the
same time. The original “spiral model” suggests that domestic mobilization only comes after a
period of external action. Therefore, the original “spiral model” had to be adapted to comply
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with the additional elements of contentious politics. The new contentious “spiral model” that was
introduced begins with a repression phase just like the original “spiral model,” but it is followed
by a period of social change. This social change then activates domestic and international
mobilizing structures simultaneously that use repertoires of contention to initiate an opportunity
spiral. The further this opportunity spiral progresses, the more the state is threatened. With the
successful completion of an opportunity spiral comes changed policies and actions on the part of
the state until finally there is an absence of human rights violations.
In the case of both the Damascus Spring and the Arab Spring, there was a period of
severe repression followed by a social change. During the Damascus Spring, this social change
was the death of Hafez al-Assad in 2000 and the following liberal opening created by Bashar alAssad. During the Arab Spring, the social change was initiated by a regional movement that
lowered the revolutionary threshold of citizens in Syria. As a result of the protests in other Arab
countries like Tunisia, Syrians no longer felt the need to hide behind a wall of fear. These social
changes initiated the uprisings in 2000 and 2011 that were characterized by domestic and
international mobilizing structures. Unfortunately, those of the Damascus Spring were too
exclusive too gain real support for the cause. The formal structures used repertoires of contention
such as salons and formal statements that were only accessible to the intellectual elite. They also
failed to directly challenge the regime on the issue of torture because they feared a backlash
similar to that of the Hama massacre.
Contrastingly, the opposition during the Arab Spring relied on everyday social networks
and repertoires of contention such as large demonstrations and social media that opened up the
movement to a diversity of participants. This widespread mobilization extended itself to the
campaign to end the practice of torture, especially since the scale of torture dramatically
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increased during the Arab Spring. Torture was no longer intended to scare the opposition into
submission, instead, it was designed to exterminate the opposition as whole. This development
prompted organizations to shift their focus to evidence collection as a way to prepare for taking
collective action against torture in the future. Syrians were able to collect this evidence of the
abuses using their phones and sharing the images on social media or with civil society.
The following figures summarize these various elements of the contentious “spiral
model” and their outcomes during both the Damascus Spring and the Arab Spring.
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Figure 17: Contentious “Spiral Model” for the 2000 Damascus Spring with Foreign
Alliances
Hafez al-Assad’s “As If” Culture and Legacy
of Hama Massacre
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1
80

Figure 18: Contentious “Spiral Model” for the 2011 Arab Spring with Foreign Alliances

Limited Political Rights and Civil Liberties
under Bashar al-Assad

Regional Arab Spring Movement

Sunni Muslims, Working
Class, Women, Youth

Large protests, social media,
evidence gathering and
publishing

Russia,
Iran,
China

Western countries, Arab League, exiled
intellectuals, first-generation immigrants
of Syrian dissent, Muslim Brotherhood

Threat
Spiral

Reports from International
NGOs, sanctions, official
statements from foreign
countries

Limited policy changes in the
beginning of the protests,
including the repeal of the
1963 Emergency Law
Opportunity
Spiral

Opportunity
Spiral
State does not change its
actions

Freedom from Torture:
Significantly below a rating
of 1

81

It is evident that regardless of the effectiveness of the different mobilizing structures and
repertoires of contention, both movements ultimately failed because of the interference of Syria’s
allies. That is the only factor that remains constant between the two uprisings and campaigns.
Syria’s allies prevented the opportunities gained by the opposition from initiating a threat spiral
within the state. During the Damascus Spring, Syria’s allies ignored Assad’s backlash against the
opposition, allowing him to deflect its threatening demands made in the Statement of 1000.
These countries, which included Western and Arab nations, displayed leniency because they
needed the support of Syria in resolving the Second Intifada and fighting the War on Terror. The
state’s backlash took the form of arresting key leaders of the movement, like Riad Seif, which
fragmented the campaign. By the time foreign organizations like Amnesty International began to
step in and publish their own critical reports, the movement had died. During the Arab Spring,
Syria’s allies took a direct approach to blocking the opposition and supporting Assad’s backlash.
Russia and Iran have funded Syria’s military, and Russia and China have been vetoing
international resolutions to stop Assad’s violent attacks on protestors and the torture of citizens
in forums like the UN and the ICC. Additionally, other foreign countries delayed their response
to the Syrian Arab Spring to protect their own interests in the Middle East, forcing the opposition
to militarize and fragmenting the non-militant branch of the opposition. Therefore, the Assad
regime has been immune to the onset of a threat spiral and the need to reform because of Syria’s
geopolitical significance in the Middle East.
Nevertheless, there is a new mobilizing structure being used by the campaign to end the
practice of state-sponsored torture that has the potential to pressure Assad to make concessions
because it acts independently of Syria’s allies. A transnational network has been established
between domestic groups working with Syrians on the ground and the European court system.
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The network is arresting former members of the Assad regime with the hope of holding them
accountable for their crimes. It is using the physical evidence collected by the domestic Syrian
movement in order to strengthen the claims made in the cases. While this mobilizing structure
cannot directly pressure Assad because of the protection offered to him under the principle of
diplomatic immunity, it has the potential to gradually initiate a threat spiral. The more people the
network can arrest, the fewer people that remain loyal to Assad. Additionally, if the Assad
regime wants to be reintegrated into international politics, then it may be forced to recognize the
legitimacy of these trials. This repertoire is so effective because it is based on the principle of
universal jurisdiction, which gives legal jurisdiction to countries with no direct connection to the
case, avoiding the veto power of countries like Russia and China.
In conclusion, this research has exposed some important truths regarding the successful
implementation of human rights norms. For many years scholars simply suggested applying the
same tried and true method of increased pressure from all sides, but as this case study on Syria
has demonstrated that method is not only flawed, but even dangerous. That strategy ignores the
fact that most countries will prioritize their own national interests at the expense of the human
rights, and even lives, of another nation’s citizens. In Syria, thousands of activists and protestors
have been arrested or died trying to force the Assad regime to change, just to be undermined by
regional geopolitics. It would be completely wrong to say that no one should have written the
Statement of 1000 in 2001 or taken to the streets in 2011. What is wrong is the way that the
entire world supported the opposition. International actors failed to work together with their
domestic counterparts, and they focused on targeting the state itself before they addressed the
foreign assistance that has provided for the regime’s survival. Until human rights campaigns can
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convince the world that the world’s interests are their own national interests, senseless violence,
like what is occurring in Syria, will continue to impact the lives of countless, innocent civilians.
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